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The aging of the population shakes the public finance of pay-as-you-go social security
systems. We develop a political-economy framework in which this demographic change leads
to the downsizing of the social security system, and, as a consequence, to the emergence of
supplemental individual retirement programs. Making the balanced-budget rule (of the type of
the Stability and Growth Pact in the EU) more flexible, to accommodate a one-shot cost of the
social security reforms, is shown to facilitate the political-economy transition from a national
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The economic viability of national old-age security systems has been increasingly deteriorating
in the wake of aging of the population. The demographers Oepper and Vaupel (2002) pose
the question, ￿is life expectancy approaching its limit?" Their answer: ￿Many.... believe it is.
The evidence suggests otherwise... For 160 years, best-performance life expectancy has steadily
increased by a quarter of a year per year, an extraordinary constancy of human achievement."
Indeed the median age in Europe is forecasted to rise from 37.7 now to 52.7 in 2050 (The
Economist, August 24th, 2002, p. 22). Similarly, the ratio of the elderly (aged 60 years and
over) to the working-age population (aged 15-59 years) in Western Europe is expected to double
from 20% in the year 2000 to 40% in the year 2050 (op. cit, p. 22). These demographic trends
a r ed r i v e nm a i n l yb yd e c l i n i n gf e r t i l i t yr a t e s : 1
￿At present, West European countries are following what seems to be a normal de-
mographic path: As they became richer after the 1950s, so their fertility rates fell
sharply. The average number of children borne by each woman during her lifetime
fell from well above the ￿replacement rate" of 2.1 - the rate at which the population
remains stable - to less than 1.4 now" (op. cit., p. 11).
Evidently, aging has far-reaching implications for national pension systems. As put by The
Economist (August 3rd, 2002, p. 23):
￿As its people grow grayer, Europe￿s state pensions systems will go deeper into the red.
Germany and Italy are trying to push the private-sector alternative. It is not easy...￿.
More concretely, for Germany:
1The U.S. has experienced a similar trend until recently, but then the fertility rate started to rise sharply.
2￿Seven-tenths of German pensions come from a state scheme with roots is Bismarck￿s day.
It is ￿nanced mainly by a levy on wages, 19.1% this year, half paid by workers and half by
employers. But, as all over Europe, the demographics are grim. Today, there are 2.8 Germans
aged 20 − 59 to support each pensioner. By 2030 there could be half as many. And the state
can￿t just fork out money to ￿ll the gap￿ (op. cit., p. 23).
And similarly, in Italy:
￿The government￿s strategy is to get private pension schemes and funds, now embryonic,
working properly ￿rst. Then, it hopes, it will be politically able to tackle the ￿nancing of the
pay-as-you-go state system. But Italy cannot aﬀord to wait. Its state￿s spending on pensions is
more than 14% of GDP, almost double the European Union average. Every year, payouts far
exceed contributions by workers and employers￿ (op. cit., p. 24).
Indeed, the aging of the population raises the burden of ￿nancing the existing pay-as-you-
go, national pension (old-age security) systems, because there is a relatively falling number of
workers, that have to bear the cost of paying pensions, to a relatively rising number of retirees.
Against this backdrop, there arose proposals to privatize social security, as a solution to the
economic sustainability of the existing systems. This, by and large, means a shift from the
current pay-as-you-go systems to individual retirement accounts (or fully-funded systems). A
supposedly added bene￿t to such a shift is the better return on the contributions to individual
accounts than to a pay-as-you-go national pension systems. However, a careful scrutiny of the
argument reveals that it is ￿awed, as neatly demonstrated by Paul Krugman (2002):
Imagine an overlapping-generations model with just one young (working) person and one old
(retired) person in each period - each individual lives for two periods. Suppose there is a pay-as-
3you-go, national pension system by which the worker contributes one euro to ￿nance the pension
bene￿t of one euro paid to the retiree. Each young person contributes one euro when young and
working and receives one euro upon retirement. Evidently, the young person earns zero return
on her contribution to the national pay-as-you-go, old-age security system. If, instead, the young
person were to invest her one euro in an individual account, she would have earned the real
market rate of return of, say, 100%, allowing her a pension of two euros at retirement. (Recall
that the average length of time between the ￿rst period of her life, in which she works, and the
second period of her life, in which she is a pensioner, could be something like 30 years; so that
a real rate of return of 100% between these two periods is not exorbitant.) Is the young person
better oﬀ with this transition from pay-as-you-go systems to individual retirement accounts? Not
if the government still wishes to honor the existing ￿social contract" (or political norm) to pay a
pension bene￿t of one euro to the old at the time of the transition. In order to meet this liability,
the government can issue a debt of one euro. The interest to be paid by the government on this
debt at the market rate of 100% will be one euro in each period, starting from the next period
ad inﬁnitum. Hence the young person will be levied a tax of one euro in the next period when
old, to ￿nance the interest payment. Thus, her net-of-tax balance in the individual account will
only be one euro, implying a zero net-of-tax return in the individual account; the same return
as in the national, pay-as-you-go system.
And what if the individual invests the one euro in the equity market and gets a better return
than the 100% which the government pays on its debt? If the capital markets are eﬃcient,
the higher equity return (relative to the government bond rate) re￿ects nothing else but a risk
premium. That is, the equity premium is equal to the risk premium through arbitrage. Therefore,
4equity investment oﬀers no gain in risk-adjusted return over government bonds. And if markets
are ineﬃcient, then the government can, as a general policy, issue debt in order to invest in
the equity market, irrespective of the issue of replacing social security by individual retirement
accounts.2,3
Nevertheless, the increased fragility of national pay-as-you-go pension, caused by the aging of
the population, raises doubts among the young about whether the next generations will continue
to honor the implicit intergenerational social contract, or the political norm, according to which,
￿I pay now for the pension bene￿ts of the old, and the next young generation pays for my pension
bene￿ts, when I get old￿. These doubts are, after all, not unfounded, for there will indeed be
2Greg Mankiw (Fortune Magazine , March 15, 1999) puts this argument this way:￿ Having trouble saving for
your retirement? Try this simple solution: Borrow some money at 7%, buy stocks that return 10%, and pocket
the 3% diﬀerence. Still running short? Don￿t worry￿just do it again.
This is, of course, ridiculous advice. Buying equities with borrowed money is a risky strategy, and no one
should do it without understanding those risks.
So let￿s consider the downside. Suppose the federal government put some of the Social Security trust fund in
equities. Now suppose that the next decade turns out less like the early 1990s and more like the early 1930s,
when the Dow Jones industrial average fell from 381 to 41￿or like Japan today, where the stock market is still at
less than half the level it reached a decade ago. What would happen?
Clearly, Social Security would be in big trouble. Not only would baby-boomers be starting to retire, automat-
ically boosting government spending on retirement programs, but the market collapse would likely coincide with
a recession, reducing tax revenue. With the trust fund drained by low stock prices, Social Security bene￿ts would
almost certainly be cut. A lot.
Although the downside risk is far from negligible, it could still be a risk worth taking. Buying stocks rather
than bonds does work out, on average, and we would be irrational to avoid risk at all costs. But there are several
reasons to think it￿s a bad bet.
First, it seems an unlikely coincidence that the proposal (to go short on equities and long on government bonds)
comes on the heels of several years (the 1990s) of truly exceptional stock returns. If we take a look at history,
however, the stock market isn￿t nearly as impressive: In the 19th century, the average premium for investing in
stocks over bonds was less than 3%.
Second, the stock market￿s historical performance re￿ects a large amount of good luck. We live in the world￿s
richest country, at the end of the most prosperous century ever; it should come as no surprise that the market
has done so well. The future may give us a similarly lucky draw, but let￿s not count on it.
Third, some economists see the large historical equity premium as an anomaly that￿s already been corrected.
Most measures of stock market valuation are now at historical extremes. Perhaps this is because investors,
realizing stocks were undervalued in the past, have corrected the problem. If so, stocks are unlikely to keep
outperforming bonds by the same margin.￿
See, however, Diamond and Jeanakoplos (1999) for a useful analysis of the portfolio diversi￿cation advantages
from investing retirement savings in the equity market in certain circumstances.
3See, however, Diamond and Jeanakoplos (1999) for a useful analysis of the portfolio diversi￿cation advantages
from investing retirement savings in the equity market in certain circumstances.
5more pensioners per each young worker of the next generation, and hence each one of the young
workers will have to pay more in order to honor the implicit social contract. With such doubts,
the political power balance may indeed shift towards scaling down the pay-as-you-go system,
encouraging the establishment of supplemental individual retirement accounts.4 Such accounts
are, by their very nature, fully funded, so that they are not directly aﬀected by the aging of the
population. 5 Naturally, the existing old generation opposes any scaling down of the pay-as-you-
go system, because it stands to lose pension bene￿ts (without enjoying the reduction in the social
security contributions). This opposition can, however, be softened, or altogether removed, if the
government creates a budget de￿cit in order to support the social security system and allow it
not to scale down the pension bene￿ts to the current old, so as to fully oﬀset the reduction in
social security contributions, or even allow it to maintain these bene￿ts intact. (Of course, this
de￿cit will be carried over to the future, with its debt service smoothed over the next several
generations.) However, here may stand in the way some self-imposed restrictions such as the
S t a b i l i t ya n dG r o w t hP a c ti nt h eE U ,w h i c hp u tac e i l i n go nt h ec u r r e n t￿scal de￿cit.6
In any event, the current systems are by and large insolvent because of the aging of the
population so either social security taxes are increased exorbitantly or else government debt
could, according to some projections, reach 150% of national income in the EU at large by 2050,
4The welfare state may also come under attack because of international tax competition brought about by
globalization; see, for instance, Sinn (1990) and Lassen and Sorensen (2002). On the other hand, Rodrik (1998)
advances an opposite hypothesis that exposure to foreign trade, another facet of globalization, generates greater
income uncertainties; consequently, the public demand for social insurance rises.
5Naturally , the aging of the population has some bearing on individual retirement accounts too through the
general-equilibrium eﬀects on the return to capital (stemming from the induced change in the capital-labor ratio).
6The idea of the Stability and Growth Pact is to prevent governments from running loose ￿scal policies at
the expense of the other euro-area countries. This could happen through either higher interest rates, if the ECB
oﬀset the ￿scal laxity with tight monetary policy, or by higher risk premium on euro-area government bonds.
But, to the extent that the Pact in its current version is an impediment to social security reform, it can cause
the deterioration of the ￿scal stance in the future, and the social security system will move into de￿cits. Other
notable limitations of the Pact are described in Calmfors et al (2003).
6and 250% in Germany and France. Recall that the debt target ceiling in the pact is only 60%!
In this paper we develop an analytical model in which a pay-as-you-go, old-age security
system is designed as a political-economy equilibrium. We then investigate how the aging of the
population can shift the equilibrium towards scaling down this ￿scal system (thereby encouraging
the emergence of individual retirement accounts). We further examine how lifting the ceiling on
￿scal de￿cits can politically facilitate such a scaling down of pay-as-you-go systems.7
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops a political-economy framework
for determining the social security system. Section 3 considers the eﬀe c to fa g i n go nt h es o c i a l -
security system. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀect of making the balanced-budget rule more ￿exible.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Political-Economy Architecture Of Social Security: A
Simple Framework
Consider a standard overlapping-generations model in which each generation lives for two periods:
a working period and a retirement period. Following Saint-Paul (1994) and Razin and Sadka
(1995), we assume a stylized economy in which there are two types of workers: skilled workers
who have high productivity and provide one eﬃciency unit of labor per unit of labor time, and
unskilled workers who provide only q<1 eﬃciency units of labor per unit of labor time. Workers
have one unit of labor time during their ￿rst period of life, but are born without skills and thus
with low productivity. Each worker chooses whether to acquire an education and become a
7Razin ,Sadka and Swagel (2002a) deal with a diﬀerent issue related to aging populations. They analyze how
the willingless of a falling number of young workers to support an increasing number of retirees is aﬀected by
aging.
7skilled worker, or else remain unskilled. After the working period, individuals retire, with their
consumption funded by private savings and social security pension, discussed below.
There is a continuum of individuals, characterized by an innate ability parameter, e which
is the time needed to acquire skill. By investing e units of labor time in education, a worker
becomes skilled, after which the remaining (1 − e) units of labor time provide an equal amount
of eﬀective labor in the balance of the ￿rst period. Less capable individuals require more time
to become skilled and thus ￿nd education more costly in terms of lost income (education is a
full-time activity). We assume positive pecuniary costs of acquiring skills, γ, which is not tax
deductible.8 The cumulative distribution function of innate ability is denoted by G(.) with the
support being the interval [0,1]. The density function is denoted by g = G0.
If an individual with an innate ability level (henceforth an e-individual) acquires skill, then
her income is (1−τ)w(1−e)−γ, whereas if she remains unskilled her income is (1−τ)qw,w h e r e
w i st h ew a g er a t ep e re ﬃciency unit of labor and τ is the social security contribution (tax) rate.
Therefore, there exists a cutoﬀ level, e∗, such that those with education-cost parameter below e∗
will invest in education and become skilled, whereas everyone else remains unskilled. The cutoﬀ
level is determined by an equality between the return to education and the cost of education
(including foregone income):
(1 − τ)w(1 − e
∗) − γ =( 1− τ)qw.
Rearranging terms gives the cutoﬀ level in the education decision:
8This is a realistic assumption. Unlike corporations for which depreciation of capital is deductible, for indi-
viduals the pecuniary cost of investment in human capital is not.
8e
∗ =1− q − γ/[(1 − τ)w]. (1)
To obtain analytical results, we use a speci￿cation in which factor prices are exogenously
determined. This speci￿cation breaks any income links between generations, except for explicitly
determined intergenerational transfers that are explained later. To simplify, we assume a linear
production function in which output, Y, is produced using labor, L, and capital, K:
Y = wL+( 1+r)K. (2)
T h ew a g er a t e ,w and the gross (before depreciation) rental price of capital, 1+r, are determined
by the marginal productivity conditions for factor prices:
w = ∂Y/∂L and 1+r = ∂Y/∂K.
These conditions are already substituted into the production function. For simplicity, we assume
that capital fully depreciates at the end of the production process. The linearity of the production
function can arise as an equilibrium outcome through either international capital mobility or
factor price equalization in the presence of goods trade. The two types of labor are assumed to
be perfect substitutes in production in terms of eﬃciency units of labor input.
We assume that the population grows at a rate of n. Labor supply of each individual is
assumed to be ￿xed, so that the social security tax does not distort the individual labor-supply
decisions, at the margin. The aggregate labor supply does, however, depend on the income tax
r a t e ,a st h i sa ﬀects the cut-oﬀ ability, e∗, and thus the mix of skilled and unskilled individuals in
9the economy. This distortion keeps the tax rate from being driven up to 100%. At the current









∗)N0(1 + n), (3)
where No(1+n) is the size of the working-age population at present (No is the number of young
individuals born in the preceding period), and  (e∗)=
R e∗
0 (1−e)dG+q[1−G(e∗)] is the average
labor supply (per worker) in the current period.
There is a pay-as-you-go, old-age social security system by which the taxes collected from
the young (working) population are earmarked to ￿nance a pension-bene￿t to the old (retired)
population. Thus, the bene￿t (bt), paid to each individual at present, must satisfy the following
pay-as-you-go budget constraint:
bN0 = τwL= τw (e
∗)No(1 + n),
where τ is the social security tax at present. Dividing through by No yields an explicit formula
for the pension bene￿t:
b = τωl(e
∗)(1 + n). (4)
Votes are repeated every period. In each period, the bene￿t of the social-security system
accrues only to the old, whereas the burden (the social-security taxes) are borne by the young.
Then, one may wonder why would not the young, who outnumber the old with a growing popu-
lation, drive the tax and the bene￿t down to zero in a political-economy equilibrium. We appeal
10to a sort of an implicit intergenerational social contract which goes like this:9 ￿I, the young, pay
now for the pension bene￿ts of the old; and you, the young of the next generation, will pay for
my pension bene￿t, when I grow old and retire￿. This implicit intergenerational contract could
be an outcome of an intergenerational game, with trigger strategies, as shown in Cooley and
Soares (1999a and 1999b). The young believe that if they do not pay the old a pension bene￿t,
then the next young generation will punish them by not providing for their pensions. With such
a contract in place, the young at present are willing to politically support a social security tax,
τ, which is earmarked to pay the current old a pension bene￿to fb, because they expect the
young generation in the next period to honor the implicit social contract and pay them a bene￿t
αb. The parameter α is assumed to depend negatively on the share of the old in the population.
If the current young will each continue to bring n children, then the share of the old will not
change in the next period and α is expected to be one. But if fertility falls and the share of the
old in the next period rises relative to the present, then α is expected to fall below one. This is
because the young believe that if fertility falls in the future, the next young generation will either
￿nd it harder or will be plainly reluctant to continue to support the old (the current) young at
the current level.10
Because factor prices are constant over time, current saving decisions will not aﬀect the rate
of return on capital that the current young will earn on their savings. Hence, the dynamics in
this model are redundant. For any social security tax rate, τ, equations (1) and (4) determine
the functions e∗ = e∗(τ) and b = b(τ).D e n o t e b y W(e,τ,α) the lifetime income of a young
9See Cooley and Soares (1999a, 1999b) for a game-theoretic formulation of such an inter-generational contract.






(1 − τ)w(1 − e) − γ + αb(τ)/(1 + r) for e≤ e∗(τ)
(1 − τ)wq + αb(τ)/(1 + r) for e≥ e∗(τ).
(5)
In each period, the political-economy equilibrium for the social security tax, τ (and
the associated pension bene￿t, b), is determined by majority voting among the young and old
individuals who are alive in this period. The objective of the old is quite clear: so long as raising
the social security tax rate, τ, generates more revenues, and consequently, a higher pension
bene￿t, b, they will vote for it. However, voting of the young is less clear-cut. Because a young
individual pays a tax bill of τw(1−e) or τwq, depending on her skill level, and receives a bene￿t
of αb/(1+r), in present value terms, she must weigh her tax bill against her bene￿t. She votes









Therefore, if ∂W/∂τ > 0 for some eo,t h e n∂W/∂τ > 0 for all e>e o; and, similarly, if ∂W/∂τ < 0
for some eo,t h e n∂W/∂τ < 0 for all e<e0. This implies that if an increase in the social security
tax rate bene￿ts a particular young (working) individual (because the increased pension bene￿t
outweighs the increase in the tax bill), then all young individuals who are less able than her
(that is, those who have a higher cost-of-education parameter, e), must also gain from this tax
increase. Similarly, if a social security tax increase hurts a certain young individual (because
the increased pension bene￿t does not fully compensate for the tax hike), then it must also hurt
12all young individuals who are more able than her.
As was already pointed out, the old always opt for a higher social security tax. But as long
as n>0, the old are outnumbered by the young. To reach an equilibrium, the bottom end of
the skill distribution of the young population joins forces with the old to form a pro-tax coalition
of 50% of the population,whereas the top end of the skill distribution of the young population
forms a counter, anti-tax coalition of equal size. In determining the outcome of majority voting
the decisive voter must be a young individual, with an education-cost index denoted by eM,s u c h
that the young who have an education-cost index below eM (namely, the anti-tax coalition) form
50% of the total population. The political-economy equilibrium tax rate maximizes the lifetime
income of this median voter.
Formally, eM is de￿ned as follows. There are No(1 + n)G(eM) young individuals with cost-
of-education parameter e ≤ eM (more able than the median voter), and No(1 + n)[1 − G(eM)]
young individuals with cost-of-education parameter e ≥ eM (less able than the median voter).
There are also No retired individuals at present who always join the pro-tax coalition. Hence,
eM is de￿ned implicitly by:
N0(1 + n)G(eM)=No(1 + n)[1 − G(em)] + No









As noted, the political equilibrium tax rate, τ, denoted by τo(eM,α), maximizes the
13l i f e t i m ei n c o m eo ft h em e d i a nv o t e r :
τo(eM,α)=a r gm a x
τ W(eM,τ,α). (8)
This equilibrium tax rate is implicitly de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition:
∂W[eM,τ0(eM,α),α]
∂τ
≡ B[eM,τ0(eM,α),α]=0 , (9)
and the second-order condition is:
∂2W[eM,τ0(eM,α),α]
∂τ2 = Bτ[eM,τo(eM,α),α] ≤ 0, (10)
where Bτ is the partial derivative of B with respect to its second argument.
Recent models [see Cooley and Soarez (1999a) and Bohn (1999)] have used an explicit
game-theoretic reasoning to address the issue of the survivability of the pay-as-you-go social
security system. This literature demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in an overlapping-
generations model with social security as a sequential equilibrium in an in￿nitely repeated voting
game. The critical support mechanism is provided by trigger strategies. As put by Bohn:
￿The failure of any cohort to adhere to the proposed equilibrium triggers a nega-
tive change in voters￿ expectations about future bene￿ts that destroys social security.
Since survival and collapse are discrete alternatives, trigger strategy models provide
a natural de￿nition of what is meant by social security being viable."
To support social security as a sequential equilibrium, there is a very simple condition that
must be ful￿lled. For the median voter, the present value of future bene￿ts exceeds the value of
14social security contributions until retirement. This condition is easily satis￿ed in our overlapping
generations model.
3 Social Security under Strain: Aging Population
The aging population puts the pay-as-you-go, old-age social security systems under strain. The
burden of ￿nancing the pension bene￿ts to the old falls on fewer young shoulders, when popula-
tion ages, as we have already pointed out. Thus, if the fertility of the current young falls below
the fertility rate (n) of their parents, then the share of the old in the next period will rise. The
current young expects the next young generation to reduce the bene￿t it pays to the old (current
young) generation.11 That is, the current young generation perceives a smaller α.
In order to ￿nd the eﬀect of aging on social security, we investigate the eﬀect of a decline in
α on the equilibrium social security tax rate, τo(eM,α). Diﬀerentiate equation (9) totally with







where Bα is the partial derivative of B with respect to its third argument. Because -Bτ is
nonnegative [see the second-order condition (10)], it follows that the sign of ∂τo/∂α is the same
as the sign of Bα. It also follows from equation (9) that Bα = ∂2W/∂α∂τ. Employing equation
11In the appendix we analyze in our framework the eﬀect of aging on the size of the welfare state.










Naturally, no one will vote for raising the social security tax if db/dt < 0, because in such a
case, the pension-bene￿t falls when the social security tax is raised. Put diﬀerently, a political-
economy equilibrium will never be located on the ￿wrong￿ side of the Laﬀer curve, where a tax



















for e = e∗(τ)
, (13)
so that, when the lifetime income of the median voter is maximized that is, when B =0[see







w(1 − eM)(1 + r)/α if eM 5 e∗(τ)










We conclude that when the young population expects reduced social security bene￿ts because
of the aging of the populations (that is, when α falls), the public indeed votes for scaling down the
16social security system already at present (that is, for lowering τ and b). As a result, the young
resort to supplemental old-age savings, such as individual retirement accounts. Naturally, the
old are worse-oﬀ as a result of reducing b. But, they are outvoted by the young, whose attitude
for lowering τ has turned stronger, following the reduction in the social security bene￿ts that
they will get.
4 Making the Balanced-Budget Rule More Flexible
The old, naturally, continue to oppose the (partial) transition from a pay-as-you-go, old age
social security system to individual retirement accounts, because they lose some of their pension
bene￿ts. They also have a strong moral claim that they contributed their fair share to the social
security system, when they were young, but they receive at retirement less than what they paid
when they were young. Their opposition, strengthened perhaps by being morally justi￿ed, can be
accommodated, in part or in full, if the government is allowed to make a debt-ﬁnanced transfer
to the social security system, so as to allow the system to pay pension bene￿ts in excess of the
social security tax revenues. This de￿cit is carried forward to the future, and its debt-service
is smoothed over the next few generations, so that its future tax implications for the current
young generation is not signi￿cant. This, of course, requires relaxation of some restrictions of
the sorts imposed by the Stabilization and Growth Pact in the EU during the transition from
social security to individual retirement accounts.
For simplicity, suppose that the government makes a transfer at the exact amount that is
required to keep the pension bene￿ts of the current old intact, despite the reduction in the social
security tax rate. Speci￿cally, when τ falls, then the term b in equation (4), that is ￿nanced
17by this τ, falls as well. But we assume that the government compensates the old generation,
so as to maintain the total pension bene￿ts intact. Therefore, despite the fall in b, the old are
indiﬀerent to the reduction in τ (and, consequently, the reduction in b). Thus, the outcome of
the majority voting is now eﬀectively determined by the young only. The median voter is now
a median among the young population only. This median voter has a lower cost-of-education
index than before; that is, eM will fall.
In order to ￿nd the eﬀect of the fall in eM on the political-economy equilibrium social security







where, as before, the sign of ∂τ/∂eM i st h es a m ea st h es i g no f BeM, because Bτ ≤ 0. Note that





wf o re M <e ∗(τ)
0 for eM >e ∗(τ)
. (17)
Thus, we conclude that ∂τ/∂eM is nonnegative: it is positive when the median voter is a skilled
individual (that is, when eM <e ∗), and zero when the median voter is an unskilled individual
(that is, when eM >e ∗). Hence, a decline in eM decreases (or leaves intact) the social security
tax τo(eM,α) and the associated bene￿t b. .
The rationale for this result is straightforward. All unskilled people have the same lifetime
income, regardless of their cost-of-education parameter, e. Therefore, the attitude towards the
(τ,b)− p a i ri st h es a m ef o ra l lo ft h e m . H e n c e ,t h ec h a nge in the median voter has no consequence
18on the outcome of the majority voting, when this median voter is an unskilled individual. For
skilled individuals, lifetime income increases when the education-cost parameter, e, declines.
Because the social security system is progressive with respect to the cost-of-education parameter,
the net bene￿t from it (that is, the present value of the expected pension bene￿tm i n u st h es o c i a l
security tax) declines, as lifetime income increases (that is, as e falls). Therefore, a decline in the
cost-of-education parameter of the median voter, eM, lowers the political-economy equilibrium
social security tax and pension bene￿t.
Thus, making the ￿scal constraints, of the sorts imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact
in the European Union, more ￿exible, may facilitate the political-economy transition from a
national pay-as-you-go, old-age social security system to a fully funded private pension system.
Such a transition, will, of course, improve the viability of the national system during and after
the transition. But this comes at a cost of a lesser degree of income redistribution, an inherent
feature of a national system.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The idea of the Stability and Growth Pact is to prevent governments from running loose ￿scal
policies at the expense of other euro-area countries. This spillover eﬀect could happen through
higher interest rates, if the ECB oﬀset the ￿scal laxity with tight monetary policy, or through
higher risk premium on euro-area government bonds. But the Pact, as it is rigidly constructed,
neglects long-term ￿scal considerations. Because it creates political-economy impediments to
social-security reforms which, if implemented, can improve the ￿scal balance in the future.
We emphasize in this paper that the aging population shakes the public ￿nance of pay-as-
19you-go, old-age social security systems. We demonstrate how in a political-economy framework
these deteriorated balances lead to the down-sizing of the social system, and the emergence of
supplemental individual retirement accounts. Indeed, Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) ￿nd a
negative correlation between the dependency ratio (which increases with the aging of the pop-
ulation) and labor tax rates, in a 1970s-1990s sample that includes twelve Western European
countries and the United States. Similarly, a negative correlation is found between the depen-
dency ratio and per capita social transfers. These ￿ndings are consistent with the hypothesis of
this paper that aging puts political-economic pressures so as to downsize pay-as-you-go, old-age
national systems.
We illustrate these ￿ndings in Tables 1 and 2 which can be found in Razin, Sadka and
Swagel (2002b). Table 1 contains results for reduced-form determinants of the tax rate on
labor income. Table 2 contains results for reduced-form determinants of the per capita social
transfers.The coeﬃcients on the dependency ratio are negative and highly signi￿cant in both
tables, as suggested by theory.
20Table 1: Determinants of Tax Rate on
Labor Income (dependent variable: labor tax rate, 146 observations)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)













































































R2 0.652 0.656 0.690 0.708 0.728
a All speci￿cations include country ￿xed eﬀects (coeﬃcients not shown). The t statistics are
in parentheses.
21Table 2 shows results for the determinants of social transfers per person (in the common
currency of real dollars). As with the labor tax rate, the dependency ratio has a signi￿cant
negative eﬀect.
Table 2 : Determinants of Per Capita Social Transfers
(dependent variable: social transfers per capita in real dollars,
146 observations)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)













































































R2 0.497 0.616 0.620 0.633 0.641
a All speci￿cations include country ￿xed eﬀects (coeﬃcients not shown). The t statistics are
in parentheses.
These ￿ndings are consistent with the hypothesis of this paper that aging exerts political-
22economic pressure so as to downsize pay-as-you-go, old-age national systems.
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25APPENDIX: THE EFFECT OF AGING ON THE WELFARE STATE
We note that the share of the old in the population at any period t is N0(1 + n)t−1/[N0(1 +
n)t−1 + N0(1 + n)t]=1 /(2 + n). Thus, a decline in fertility (namely a decline in n) causes
population to age (namely, to have a higher share of the old in the population). In order to ￿nd
the eﬀect of a change in n on the political-economy equilibrium tax rate, note that equations
(1) and (4) now de￿ne e∗ as a function e∗(τ) of τ and b as a function b(τ,n) of τ and n. Also,
equation (7) determines eM aaf u n c t i o neM(n) of n.





(1 − τ)ω(1 − e) − γ + αb(τ,n)/(1 + r) for e 5 e∗(τ)
(1 − τ)ωq + αb(τ,n)/(1 + r) for e = e∗(τ)
(50)
.










−ω[1 − eM(n)] + αbτ(τ,n)/(1 + r) for e 5 e∗(τ)
−ωq + αbτ(τ,n)/(1 + r) for e = e∗(τ)
(130)

















dn + αbτn[τ0(n),n]/(1 + r) for eM 5 e∗(τ)
αbτn[τ0(n),n] for eM = e∗(τ).
(2A)
Note from equation (4) that:
bτn = bτ/(1 + n) > 0, (3A)
by equation (14).
Suppose ￿rst that the decisive voter is an unskilled (young) individual, that is eM = e∗(τ).
Then Bn > 0, and hence dτ0/dn > 0. That is, aging (a decline in n) downscale the welfare state
in this case. However, deM/dn < 0 [see equation (7)], so that we cannot a priori sign dτ0/dn.
Nevertheless, our regressions (see the concluding section) still indicate that dτ0/dn > 0:aging
downscale the welfare state.12
12The rationale for this result is straightforward. As can be seen from equation (4), aging (namely, a decline in
n) puts a higher burden on the shoulders of the young whose tax payments ￿nance the welfare state. This eﬀect
works in the direction of making the decisive voter opt for a smaller tax (and pension bene￿t). But aging may also
tilt the political power balance in favor of the pro-tax coalition: A decline in n raises eM - the cost-of-education
parameter of the decision voter. When the eM−individual is unskilled, this does not change the choice of the
decisive coter, because all unskilled individuals have the same preferences for τ (and b). Hence, when the decisive
voter is unskilled, then we unambiguously conclude that aging downscales the size of the welfare state. But when
the decisive voter is a skilled individual, then the change in the identity of the decisive voter as a result of aging
(she is now less able) works in the direction of raising τ (and b). This is why dτ0/dn cannot be signed a priori
when the decisive voter is a skilled individual.
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